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I. INTRODUCTION
Remember the good old days? They were a place in time when things
were cheaper, neighborhoods were safer, children respected their elders, and
the judiciary was an honorable profession comprised of independent and
impartial judges. If you have even an ounce of cynicism coursing through your
veins, you might question the existence of such an idealistic fantasyland, but
the point is well taken. Times have changed. We live in a day and age where
Christmas shopping requires a loan, people have to lock their doors, and judges
have to be coached in the game of politics. The transformation of judges from
impartial facilitators of justice to seasoned politicians creates doubts about the
integrity of our judicial system. The foray of politics into the judiciary rises to
the forefront of modern day issues because “[t]here could hardly be a higher
governmental interest than a State’s interest in the quality of its judiciary.”1
These issues have led to the implementation of rules to keep politics out of the
judiciary. More specifically, rules are in place restricting the political speech
of judges and judicial candidates. This commentary focuses on the battle
between these rules and judicial freedom of speech.
Due to a recent United States Supreme Court decision2 and the
monetary increase in campaign contributions,3 it is necessary to re-evaluate
Illinois’ policy on restricting the speech of incumbent judges and judicial
candidates. In June 2002, the United States Supreme Court, in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 4 held a clause in the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s Code of Judicial Conduct stating that a candidate for judicial offic e
cannot “announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues”5
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violated the First Amendment.6 As it turns out, Illinois is one step ahead of the
United States Supreme Court in invalidating such clauses.
In 1993, the Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals found
the exact same clause unconstitutional in Illinois’ Code of Judicial Conduct, in
addition to a clause prohibiting “pledges and promises of conduct in office.”7
In August 1993, Illinois amended its Code of Judicial Conduct which now
states “[a] candidate for judicial office shall not make statements that commit
or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or
issues within cases that are likely to come before the court . . . .”8 Upon these
changes, Illinois established itself as a state with a comparably liberal policy on
restricting judicial speech.9
Additionally, judicial campaign funds are becoming indistinguishable from
legislative campaign funds. The Institute for Legal Reform, at the behest of
the United States Chamber of Commerce, gave $10 million to the campaigns
of judges who were “pro-business.”10 In Ohio, the campaign funds for a seat
on the supreme court increased from $100,000 in 198011 to about $9 million in
2000.12 Three judicial candidates in the 2000 Michigan Supreme Court election
spent at least $16 million each.13 On the Ohio Supreme Court, Justice Resnick
received $1 million in campaign contributions from Ohio trial lawyers. 1 4
Finally, in 2000, campaign funds for the Illinois Supreme Court election reached
an ultimate high at a collective $5 million.15
While campaigning is an expensive prospect, the substantial increase in
campaign funds is disconcerting. The public cannot help but question the
purpose of, and a judicial candidate’s motivation for, such contributions. The
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propensity of Illinois and the United States Supreme Court to take liberal
stances on judicial speech, compounded by the increased similarity between
campaigns of judges and legislators, compromises the integrity of the judiciary.
Moreover, the trend decreases the public’s confidence in the judicial system
in the same downward motion as the public’s confidence in the integrity of
other branches of the government.16
In the battle between judicial freedom of speech and protecting the
judiciary from politics, protection should win. To accomplish this goal, the
liberalization of restrictions on judicial speech must cease. This comment
proposes that Illinois re-establish a strict policy restricting judicial speech by
prohibiting a judicial candidate from “announc[ing] his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues [hereinafter “announce clause”].”17 Part II of this
comment addresses Illinois’ current and past positions on restricting judicial
speech, as well as the United States Supreme Court’s position. Part III of this
comment examines the limitations of clauses other than the “announce clause”
in restricting judicial speech. Next, this section examines the fundamental flaw
in reasoning of courts finding restrictions on judicial speech unconstitutional.
Also, this section suggests an alternative measure to educate voters in an
election in whic h judges are limited in their speech. Finally, this comment
proposes amendments to judicial codes to remedy the defects of a liberal policy
restricting judicial speech.
II. BACKGROUND
Judicial impartiality is firmly rooted in the Constitution of the United
States.18 This concept emanates from the provision in Article II giving the
President the power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint
judges of the United States Supreme Court.19 The Founding Fathers
possessed enough foresight to discern that appointed judges are less likely to
rule according to the views of a particular constituency.20 State court judges,
however, are of a different breed, and by the early nineteenth century, some
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states began selecting judges through the elective process.21 Consequently, in
recognizing the potential for venality, states created judicial codes to prevent
certain political activity and speech by judicial candidates.22 Although a
variation on the “announce clause” was adopted in 1924, the first true
“announce clause” was not developed until the 1972 ABA Model Code. 23 The
“announce clause” remained unchallenged in any federal court until 198424 and
in Illinois until 1993.25
A. Illinois’ Old Rule 6726
The original canon in the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct stated that a
judicial candidate “should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office
[hereinafter “pledges and promises clause”]; announce his views on disputed
legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity . . . .”27 The original canon
provided an all-encompassing restriction on the political statements of judges.28
The “pledges and promises clause” prohibited judicial candidates from making
promises except to faithfully uphold the letter of the law.29 To fill any gaps in
the restrictions, the “announce clause” prohibited judicial candidates from
making a statement of opinion on “disputed legal and political issues.”30 A list
of such issues would likely be endless as “disputed legal and political issues”
can be interpreted to include a variety of topics ranging from the Constitution
to world affairs.31
In realizing these controversies, the Seventh Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals found Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67 unconstitutional. 32 In
the 1990 Illinois Supreme Court election, Justice Buckley distributed campaign

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Ogunro, supra note 20; MODEL C ODE OF JUD. C ONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972).
See Berger v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (“announce
clause” held constitutional).
See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993) (“announce clause”
held unconstitutional).
ILL. S UP . C T. R. 67(B)(1)(c) (1992) (repealed 1993).
Id.
Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231.

2003]

Comment

163

material which stated he had “never written an opinion reversing a rape
conviction.”33 The Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board filed charges against him with
the Illinois Courts Commission.34 Although no penalty was imposed, the
commission decided Justice Buckley had violated Rule 67(B)(1)(c) of the
Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct.35
In 1991, Buckley, along with the Illinois Judge’s Association, filed suit
against the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board.36 The district court upheld Rule
67(B)(1)(c), but the court of appeals found it violated the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution.37 Citing the lack of guidance from other courts,
the Seventh Circuit did not specify what kind of a restriction on judicial speech
would pass constitutional scrutiny. 38 It did hold, however, that the state’s
interest in restricting judicial candidates from making statements interpreted as
promises or commitments is not compelling enough to “circumscribe their
freedom of speech by a rule so sweeping that only complete silence would
comply with a literal . . . interpretation of the rule.”39
B. Illinois’ New Rule 6740
In August 1993, two months after the decision in Buckley, Rule 67
(A)(3)(d)(i) replaced Rule 67 (B)(1)(c).41 Illinois’ new rule replaced the
“announce clause” and “pledges and promises clause” with “a candidate for
judicial office shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the
c andidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues within cases that are
likely to come before the court [hereinafter “commit or appear to commit
clause”].”42
Illinois, like many other states, adopted the clause from the 1990 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct to replace the “announce clause.”43 Canon
5A(3)(d) states:
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[A] candidate for judicial office . . . shall not (i) make pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office; (ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to
come before the court; or (iii) knowingly misrepresent the identity,
qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or the
opponent . . . .43

At least twenty-five states have adopted the “commit or appear to commit
clause” modeled after the ABA Code or a variation on the clause that
achieves the same meaning.44 The changes provide a more narrowly tailored
restriction than the “announce clause” for First Amendment purposes by
prohibiting a judicial candidate from stating views on issues or cases “likely
to come before the court. ” 4 5 While the amendments might resolve purported
constitutional concerns, the expansion of judicial speech fails to serve Illinois’
interest in an independent judiciary.
C. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White46
A complaint was filed with the Minnesota Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board against a candidate for associate justice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, who circulated material questioning previous decisions by the
court on crime, welfare, and abortion.47 The Lawyers Board dismissed the
complaint, but the candidate, uncertain as to what constituted prohibited
speech, filed a lawsuit in the federal district court to have the “announce
clause” declared unconstitutional. 48 Restrictions on speech pass constitutional
muster only if they satisfy the strict scrutiny test.49 The strict scrutiny standard
requires the restriction to serve a compelling state interest and to be narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.50 If both elements are met, then the particular
statute or rule enduring scrutiny is constitutional. 51
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The Minnesota clause, which prompted the United States Supreme Court
to grant certiorari, stated a judicial candidate
shall not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his or her
views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his or her identity,
qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or the
opponent . . . .52

The Court interpreted the “announce clause” to prohibit more than making
promises about issues; rather the clause restricts any statement by a candidate
of his current position on legal or political issues.53 In its analysis, the Court
examined two compelling interests as a basis for the judicial speech restriction,
impartiality of the judiciary and the appearance of impartiality.54
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, proposed three definitions of
impartiality; however, under his definitions, either the impartiality was not a
compelling interest,55 it was not properly served by a narrowly tailored
“announce clause,”56 or the Minnesota Supreme Court did not adopt the
“announce clause” under the purview of the proposed definition.57 Justice
Scalia did not define impartiality in a way that would, in his opinion, constitute
a compelling state interest.58 He simply declared the “announce clause” to be
“underinclusive” as to serve any notion of impartiality.59 Thus, the Court held
the “announce clause” violates a judic ial candidate’s First Amendment right to
free speech.60
The inherent criticism thread throughout the White and Buckley cas es is
the attenuation between the “announce clause” and judicial impartiality.61
Courts are reluctant to place restrictions on speech. The hesitancy is
understandable when dabbling with First Amendment rights, but an uncertainty
abounds from the new status of judicial speech restrictions: Are the “pledges
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and promises clause” and the “commit or appear to commit clause” sufficient
to preserve an independent judiciary?
III. ANALYSIS
A. “Pledges and Promises Clause” and “Commit or Appear to Commit
Clause”
Without the “announce clause,” the “pledges or promises clause” and the
“commit or appear to commit clause” can be easily circumvented.62 The
boundaries of the “announce clause” are much more established than those of
the current clauses of choice. 63 In the absence of ambiguous terms such as
“pledge,” “promise” and “commit,” the line is much more bright line. 64 In fact,
defining the “announce clause” is one issue on which courts tend to reach a
consensus; most courts agree the clause prohibits any statement by a candidate
of his or her current position on any controverted legal or political issue. 65
However, whether a judicial candidate made a promissory statement or pledged
future conduct in office is left to the discretion of the courts.
For example, the Ohio Supreme Court found a judicial candidate’s
statement of “I would run a court that views convic ted felons from the
standpoint that they are going to be incarcerated,”66 does not violate the state’s
“pledges and promises clause.”67 The court held that the statement is a
“philosophical viewpoint” and is “unlikely to rise to a pledge or promise as
reasonable persons would define them.”68 Another court, however, could just
as easily decide that a reasonable person would likely define a “promise” in the
same way the dictionary does, as “a declaration that one will do or refrain from
doing something specified” or “a ground for expectation.”69 A statement of
how one “would run a court” 70 could feasibly be classified as a declaration to
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do something specified and, most certainly, as a basis for expectation. In any
event, the entire problem is obviated in a state with the “announce clause,”
because the above statement qualifies as an announcement of a judicial
candidate’s view on sentencing convicted felons, and, thus, it violates the
“announce clause.”
Another avenue for circumvention is careful articulation of campaign
statements. One could refrain from using the words “promise” and “commit”
or include disclaimers in every campaign statement.71 While technically not a
violation of the judicial code, the inherent dangers are still present, for “the
‘nonpromissory’ statement averts none of the dangers posed by the
‘promissory’ one.”72 An “announce clause” prevents the circumvention of
promises and commitments by prohibiting the statements of judicial candidates
who attempt to inform the public how they would decide certain issues.73
In an attempt to soothe the initial impact of White, Justice Scalia assures
the public that the Court’s invalidation of Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct
does not extend to the “pledges or promises clause.”74 However, the restriction
against pledges and promises alone is not sufficient to sustain judicial codes
across the country. Promises made by judicial candidates on the campaign trail
are easily avoided by eliminating the “I promise” or “I pledge” language. 75 In
fact, to cover all points of contention, a judicial candidate could follow up every
statement with “although I cannot promise anything.”76
One wonders then what Justice Scalia suggests for liberal states, such as
Illinois, which have neither the “pledges or promises clause” nor the “announce
clause” in their Code of Judicial Conduct.77 Although Illinois replaced these
clauses with a new clause restricting judicial candidates from making
statements that “commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues within cases that are likely to come before the
court . . . ,”78 this provision suffers the same obstacles as the “pledges or
promises clause.” Judicial candidates could end their statements with the
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requisite words “but I am not committing myself”79 or narrowly define
“commit” like some courts define “promise.”80
For instance, in New York, a judicial candidate sought review of the
decision by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that the campaign
literature she circulated “committed, or appeared to commit” the candidate to
favoring the prosecution in criminal cases in violation of the “commit or appear
to commit clause” and the “pledges and promises clause.”81 The offending
campaign literature identified the candidate as a “law and order candidate.”82
In the Commission’s opinion, the statement gave the appearance of bias in
favor of the prosecution and a promise to treat criminals with a firm hand.83
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the Commission’s
interpretation and found the statement did not amount to a commitment or a
promise. 84 The court substantiated its conclusion solely on the basis that the
w ords “law and order” are “widely and indiscriminately used in everyday
parlance and election campaigns. ” 8 5 With the relaxation of the rules, courts
can twist the interpretation of almost any statement to fall outside the purview
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

B. Flaws in the White Reasoning
As stated by Justice Stevens, the fundamental flaw of courts in finding the
rules prohibiting the speech of judicial candidates unconstitutional is that it is “an
inaccurate appraisal of the importance of judicial independence and impartiality,
and an assumption that judicial candidates should have the same freedom to
express themselves on matters of current public importance as do all other
elected officials.”86 In resolving these two flaws, the “compelling interest” of
Illinois and other liberal states in adopting a strict policy on judicial speech is
apparent.
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First, the invalidation of rigid restrictions on judicial speech gives insufficient
significance to judicial impartiality.87 Our judiciary has always recognized due
process to encompass a citizen’s right to appear before a “neutral and detached
judge.”88 An incumbent judge who states his or her position on disputed legal
or political issues during the election to satisfy a particular group of constituents
feels pressure to decide cases accordingly to stay in the good graces of the
voters for the next election.89 This bias most certainly qualifies as the sort of
“direct, personal, substantial, and pecuniary” interest at the core of due process
deprivation, the kind of interest that sucks the life out of the Fourteenth
Amendment.90 Simply put, a judge’s job is not to operate at the will of the
public, but to “follow the precedent of [the] court” and promote justice. 91
Some critics, such as Justice Scalia, reiterate the common sense notion that
judicial independence is not based on a lack of predis position to the law.92
Obviously, judges are not just judges; they are human, too, and have
preconceived views on disputed issues.93 However, there is a difference
between a naturally occurring predisposition and one existing as a result of
judicial politicking.94 The former is a result of legal experience through
education and a career as an attorney or a judge. 95 The latter is a result of a
judicial candidate using his or her political statements to secure a seat on the
bench.96 Views based on politics are most likely manifested for campaign
purposes.97 Justice Scalia ignores the distinction between the two types of
predispositions, for recognition acknowledges the singular purpose in
announcing views: judicial politicking.
In Buckley, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Illinois Court Commission for
taking issue with Justice Buckley’s “innocuous” statement of “never writ[ing]
an opinion reversing a rape conviction.”98 Any reasonable person understands
the innuendo in circulating campaign materials with that statement included.
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Mark Kozlowski, Robed and Running:
Striking Prohibitions on Elected Judge’s Political
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White, 536 U.S. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. C ONST . amend. XIV, § 1 (the Due Process clause states “nor shall any State deprive any
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475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986).
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Id. at 777–78.
Id.
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The only feasible reason a judicial candidate takes the time and spends the
money to publicly make known his position on prosecuting rape offenders is to
inform and influence the voters. Justice Buckley then feels obligated while on
the bench to sustain the conviction of rapists, regardless of the merits of the
case, to satisfy the voters and secure their votes for the next election. By
announcing views on disputed legal issues, judicial candidates implicitly create
guarantees. With these guarantees, judges render decisions based on affiliation
rather than on the law and the facts. Due process has no meaning in a justice
system of this kind.
Second, the invalidation of rigid restrictions on judicial speech inaccurately
rests on the assumption that judges should have the same freedom to speak as
other individuals.99 It would be a daunting task to find someone who does not
recognize the importance of free speech as a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution, but judges are in a unique position unmatched by any other
occupation.100 They do not operate at the will of their constituents, as do
legislators but, rather, at the will of the law.101 Judges must “stand up to what
is generally supreme in democracy: the popular will.”102 Conversely,
legislators by their nature are representative of the American people, a position
which requires them to inform the public about their position on political issues
so the public can vote accordingly.103 The state’s interest in rendering justice,
without regard to the popular will, eludes the First Amendment104 and requires
a stricter restriction on the speech of judicial candidates than legislative
candidates.105 With comprehensive rules, questions arise as to how voters can
make informed choices at the polls; however, there are other ways to educate
the public besides allowing judicial politics to taint the election process.
C. Educating Voters for Elections
Judicial elections and impartiality secured by announce clauses are not
mutually exclusive. A judicial candidate’s political, social, and economic views
do not determine whether he or she is skilled enough to perform the duties of

99.
100.
101.
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Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. C HI. L. R EV. 1175, 1180 (1989).
White, 536 U.S. at 805–06 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
U.S. C ONST . amend. I.
See White, 536 U.S. at 806–07 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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the office. 106 It is possible to balance the public’s interest in engaging in
informed voting with the state’s interest in an impartial judiciary.107 Justice
Posner proposes that “only a fanatic” promotes a rule restricting a judicial
candidate’s speech to the point of only allowing “name, rank, and serial
number.”1 0 8 However, several decades ago, before judicial politicking and
swelling campaign funds, judicial campaigns were based on restricted speech,
and voters chose their candidates based on limited knowledge. Still, judges ran
successful campaigns by distributing materials absent any statements on
“disputed legal or political issues.”109
For example, in 1962 Donald W. Morthland, Republican candidate for
county judge in the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Macon County, Illinois, distributed
materials during his campaign.110 The pamphlets contained general information
about his family, education, prior legal experience, and membership in various
organizations.111 Additionally, they expressed his desire to be a part of such an
honorable profession and contained the following qualification statement: “I am
qualified to render this service by experience, education, disposition and the
proved ability to work and co-operate with people.”112 The circulation of this
pamphlet was the extent of Judge Morthland’s campaigning, yet he was
successful in his 1962 campaign and served on the bench for twenty-four years,
enjoying the respect and admiration of his peers.113 His efforts proved a
judicial candidate can abide by the strict restrictions in the Code of Judicial
Conduct and still have a successful campaign and career.
Judicial campaigns have dramatically changed since 1962. A campaign
flyer such as the one above does not exist in today’s judicial campaigns full of
political statements and innuendos. There is a definitive conflict between
restricting campaigns in the interest of judicial impartiality and allowing voters
to cast an educated vote, but strict judicial codes do not have to be
synonymous with ignorant voting. The proposed amendments do not prevent
the circulation of general information to the voting public.114 If a new Illinois
Code of Judicial Conduct is adopted, judges will not be prohibited from

106. Aaron Chambers, Buckley Rule Cited as Changing Judicial Campaigns, 50 C HI . DAILY L.
B ULL. 1 (2000).
107. White, 536 U.S. at 809–11 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
108. Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
109. ILL. S UP . C T. R. 67(B)(1)(c) (1992) (repealed 1993).
110. Memorandum from Donald W. Morthland, Republican Candidate for County Judge (Nov. 6,
1962) (on file with author).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Ron Ingram, Judge Remembered as Likable, Mentor, HER A L D & R EV., Oct. 1, 2002, at A3.
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producing campaign materials giving information on education, experience, and
other relevant qualifications. Additionally, the public can evaluate judicial
candidates based on observable factors, such as their reputation in the legal
community.115
D. Implementing the “Announce Clause” and the “Pledges or Promises
Clause”
Due process requires judicial independence, and judicial impartiality
demands that Illinois enact legislation further restricting judicial speech. The
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is a starting point for Illinois and other
states because it restricts judicial candidates from “mak[ing] pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance
of the duties in offic e,” and “statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court.”116 However, the inherent flaws in these clauses require a
more restrictive clause, free of circumvention.
Illinois needs to modify its current Code of Judicial Conduct to mirror its
pre-Buckley Code, which stated a judicial candidate cannot “make pledges or
promises of conduct in office” and “announce his views on disputed legal or
political issues.”11 7 The “pledges or promises clause” and the “announce
clause” protect judicial independence from candidates stating their views or
making promises on issues such as privacy, abortion and criminal sentencing in
an attempt to persuade voters.118 Together these two provisions will limit
judicial candidates to providing only general information during an election. An
additional benefit of the “announce clause” is the insulation of judges from
political pressures. The clauses might serve as a protective shield for
candidates who feel pressure by special interest groups to take a stance on an
issue. 119 They can maintain favor with a particular group of constituents by
blaming their silence on the restrictions.120 For example, in the 2000 Illinois
Supreme Court election, Justice Rita Garman claimed submission to the judicial
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code when a Springfield newspaper asked her opinion on gun control laws.121
She gave a “no comment” response to the newspaper due to the likelihood of
the Illinois Supreme Court hearing cases on the controversial issue. 122 In her
response, Justice Garman avoided alienating both gun control activists and
opponents.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have routinely sacrificed restrictions on judicial speech for a judicial
candidate’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech.123 However, due to
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in White124 and the monetary
increase in campaign contributions,125 it is necessary for Illinois to change its
policy restricting the speech of incumbent judges and judicial candidates.
Illinois, in a 1993 amendment, changed its Code of Judicial Conduct,
restricting judicial speech with one sweeping statement: “a candidate for
judicial office shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues within cases that are
likely to come before the court.”126 Illinois took a uniquely liberal position by
eliminating both the “pledges or promises clause” and the “announce clause”
from its Code, but the amendment does not further the interests of an impartial
judiciary.127 A judicial candidate can easily circumvent the rules with careful
wording of campaign statements.”128
Also, Illinois courts, when reviewing questionable judicial conduct, might
follow the trend of other courts by loosely interpreting the statements of judicial
candidates and narrowly defining the “commit or appear to commit clause.”129
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Subverting the obstacle infringes upon the independence of the judiciary
because some judicial candidates will use their unencumbered speech to gain
as many votes as possible by committing themselves to disputed legal and
political issues. 130 The commitment prevents a judge from deciding a case
according to the principles of justice and precedence, thereby impairing a major
element of due process, an impartial judiciary.131
Due to the magnitude of a state’s compelling interest in an independent
judiciary and the unique occupational duties of judges, stricter provisions
restricting judicial speech are necessary. Therefore, Illinois should amend its
current Code of Judicial Conduct to resemble the pre-Buckley restrictions by
adding clauses prohibiting a judicial candidate from “mak[ing] pledges or
promises of conduct in office” and “announc[ing] his views on disputed legal
or political issues.”132 While such strict restrictions on judicial speech might
seem antithetical to a democracy, voting based on selective information leaves
only one choice when comparing candidates: to vote according to the
candidate’s qualifications and past behavior. 133 Within these confines is the
best “judge” of character. After all, actions speak louder than words.
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